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Abstract Cyber Physical Systems are facing huge and diverse set of security
risks, especially cyber-attacks that can cause disruption to physical
services or create a national disaster. Information and communication
technology (ICT) has made a remarkable impact on the society. A
Cyber Physical System (CPS) relies basically on information and
communication technology, which puts the system’s assets under certain
risks especially cyber ones, and hence they must be kept under control
by means of security countermeasures that generate confidence in the
use of these assets. And so there is a critical need to give a great
attention on the cybersecurity of these systems, which consequently leads
to the safety of the physical world. This goal is achieved by adopting a
solution that applies processes, plans and actions to prevent or reduce
the effects of threats. Traditional IT risk assessment methods can do the
job, however, and because of the characteristics of a CPS, it is more
efficient to adopt a solution that is wider than a method, and addresses
the type, functionalities and complexity of a CPS. This chapter proposes
a framework that breaks the restriction to a traditional risk assessment
method and encompasses wider set of procedures to achieve a high
level strategy that could be adopted in the risk management process, in
particular the cybersecurity of cyber-physical systems.
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1 Introduction 25
A cyber-physical system refers to the system that combines both cyber and physical 26
resources, where there is a strong relation and coordination between these resources. 27
Such systems are controlled or monitored by computer-based algorithms, tightly 28
integrated with the internet and its users. CPS is basically a control system with 29
distributed networked, adapted and predictable, real-time, intelligent characteris- 30
tics, where human-computer interaction may exist. It is widely used in critical 31
national infrastructure, such as electric power, petroleum and chemical and so on 32
[1]. Moreover, many urban transportation and railway systems around the world 33
have deployed some form of communications-based automatic train control (e.g., 34
[2]). And in those systems, multiple cyber components exist, including wireless 35
communication. The potential implications of this evolution could be multi-faceted 36
and profound, especially when it comes to the issue of security. If such systems were 37
subject to a physical or cyber threat, the consequences will be unimaginable. These 38
systems are susceptible to different types of risks related to information systems 39
vulnerabilities. No one doubts about the hazardous consequences that would occur 40
in case a malicious software succeeds in controlling the system, i.e. any fail in 41
systems controlling drive-less metros will lead to huge loss. Security breaches in 42
the cyber domain, such as falsified information or malicious control logic, can have 43
a complicated impact on the physical domain [3]. “The cyber breach will lead to 44
complicated physical consequences”. Cybersecurity breaches can range from no or 45
limited impact to Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS), stealing of data, or even 46
taking over control of systems and harm the physical world [4]. In energy industry, 47
the computer system of Iran Bushehr nuclear power plant was invaded by “Stuxnet” 48
in 2010, leading a serious chaos in the automated operation of the nuclear facilities 49
and a serious setback of Iran’s nuclear program. In transport service, in the network 50
for managing and monitoring the operation of the Shinkansen, due to an exception 51
in the management system of control schedule, signaling and line switching point 52
in 2011, Japan’s 5 Shinkansen operation management system encountered failure, 53
15 trains were in outage, 124 trains were delayed and 8.12 million people’s travel 54
were affected. In water Industry, in 2011, Illinois water system was hacked and 55
a malfunction occurred in the water pump SCADA, which leading to the pump’s 56
damage and scrap. In this way, we can conclude that CPS security is so important 57
that risk incidents in the system may affect national security and stability. Taking 58
all these security incidents seriously, we conclude that any attack in the cyber layer 59
of the cyber physical system could lead to hazardous situations and even to loss in 60
lives [1]. 61
There are several approaches for the problem of risk assessment and treatment: 62
informal handbooks, methodical approaches or supporting tools, where all provide 63
a guide for risk assessment and treatment. However, methods might differ in some 64
steps, or in the way of identifying and valuating the assets or threats. Some are 65
basically used in cyber security of information systems, and others can be used 66
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the probability and the severity of the risks after identifying the assets and threats 68
using traditional IT risk assessment methods, some of these solutions do not address 69
the characteristics and the complexity of CPS, which needs a broad range of 70
management. The great challenge of these approaches is the complexity of the 71
problem they have to face; in the sense that there are many elements to be considered 72
and, if it is not done rigorously, the conclusions will be unreliable. 73
Ansaldo STS is a leading Company operating in the sector of high technology 74
for Railway and Urban Transport. The Company has the experience and resources 75
to supply innovative transport and signaling systems for freight yards, regional and 76
freight lines, underground and tramway lines, and standard and High-Speed railway 77
lines. With an international geographical organization, The Company operates 78
worldwide as lead contractor, system integrator and supplier “turnkey” of the most 79
important projects of mass transportation in metro and urban railways. Ansaldo STS 80
has a great experience in the design, implementation and management of systems 81
and services for signaling and supervision of railway and urban traffic [5]. 82
Ansaldo STS believes that there is a critical need to adopt a comprehensive 83
strategy for the problem of applying risk management study to a cyber-physical 84
system. As the complexity of the CPS is greater and such systems need more 85
procedures to be performed, a framework was developed that aims to reach a 86
common high level solution, it is different and broader than a traditional IT risk 87
management methods whose goal is mainly focused on identifying and measuring 88
the severity of the risks and try to reduce it to an acceptable extent. In fact, it 89
encompasses Seven steps and inspired by the PDCA cycle, and centered upon the 90
cyber side and its assets; however, this doesn’t mean that the physical assets are out 91
of the frame, as the physical assets of a CPS are mostly controlled by others in the 92
cyber side. This framework is characterized by a set of procedures that starts by 93
modeling the system’s assets and functionalities, selection of potential threats to the 94
CPS, conducting risk assessment and treatment through a methodical way, safeguard 95
implementation, vulnerability assessment, ensuring the compliance with global and 96
local applicable laws, and finally applying maintenance and improvement activities. 97
This chapter is divided as follows: Sect. 2 presents a set of aspects that the approach 98
mentions, Sect. 3 describes the proposed framework. Section 4 is the case study 99
that shows how Ansaldo STS Company applies this framework, and finally Sect. 5 100
concludes the work. 101
2 Aspects and Requirements 102
2.1 Cyber Physical System Security 103
CPS security has some distinct characteristics as it is different from traditional IT 104
system. In traditional IT system the first important aspect of information security 105
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those who are allowed to see it while disallowing others from learning anything 107
about its content. However for CPS, the availability comes first, then integrity and 108
confidentiality. 109
CPS has more attack points and fault points than IT system. Any safeguard 110
measures shall not interrupt the response to the physical system or delay the 111
response. In traditional IT system access control can be deployed without affecting 112
the services of IT system. In CPS all these measures should be discussed and tested 113
to great details. The data flow shall not be hindered or interfered. CPS is a system of 114
systems, the tight coupling between the physical system and cyber system has led 115
to potential cascade effect of the whole system. Malfunction whether in cyber part 116
or in the physical part will spread to other part of system [1]. 117
2.2 Threats and Vulnerabilities 118
The two main kinds of threats that affect any organization are internal and external 119
threats. Internal threats occur from within the organizations. This is probably one 120
of the most dangerous situations because for instance co-workers may know how to 121
access systems and are aware of how the systems are set up. And external threats 122
are attacks done by externals and hackers [6]. 123
(i) Internal Threats: Statistics [7, 8] show that a large amount of security 124
and privacy breaches are due to insiders. Protection from insider threats is 125
challenging because insiders may have access to many sensitive and high- 126
privileged resources. Similar style of exploitation is reported in [9, 10]. 127
(ii) External threats: External threats are those done by individuals from outside a 128
company or organization, who seeks to break defenses and exploit vulnerabil- 129
ities. Spying or eavesdropping, DoS, Spoofing, Phishing, viruses, etc. . . . , are 130
all examples of external threats or cyber-attacks. 131
On the other hand vulnerability is defined as a weakness in the system assets or 132
safeguards that facilitates the success of a potential threat and could cause damage; 133
they could exist in system, software, network, etc . . . . 134
2.3 Security Requirements 135
The cyber security of CPS calls for the use of a wide set of security controls to 136
protect the whole system against compromises of their confidentiality, integrity 137
and availability. The cybersecurity of CPS must address these main security 138
requirements: 139
(i) Integrity: It means that only the authorized users can change in the assets, it is 140
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(ii) Confidentiality: This means that the assets must not be exposed to unautho- 142
rized individuals. And access must be restricted to those authorized. This is 143
satisfied if the assets are not read or accessed by an unauthorized party. 144
(iii) Availability: This is satisfied if the assets or services are available and without 145
delay. 146
If the system were exposed to malicious activities, physical components would also 147
be affected and even damaged as a consequence. It can be said that in a CPS, the 148
availability comes first, then the integrity and confidentiality. 149
2.4 Dependencies and Accumulated Risk 150
As mentioned above, it is more efficient for a security strategy to start with 151
functional modeling of assets with defining relations and dependencies, as it leads 152
to more precise and coherent study. Dependencies affect all the calculations done 153
to assess the risk. Since assets depend on each other, the occurrence of threats on 154
assets causes a direct harm on them and an indirect harm on others that depend on 155
them. 156
3 A Comprehensive Framework for the Risk Management– 157
Cybersecurity in CPS 158
Commonly, when there is a need to assess risks, traditional methods are used to 159
do the job. Traditional risk management methods involve the following step: risk 160
identification, assessment and mitigation plan definition. However, a well-designed 161
risk assessment of CPS will provide an overall view of CPS security status and 162
support efficient allocations of safeguard resources. Though traditional IT system 163
risk assessment is quite mature, a distinct risk assessment method for CPS is needed 164
to cover the growing security issues due to the large differences between IT system 165
and CPS [1]. This framework is inspired by the PDCA (PLAN-DO-CHECK-ACT) 166
cycle. It adds a broader set of procedures for a traditional risk assessment method. 167
Companies must realize the necessity of managing data protection, they should 168
better treat and manage the security strategy addressing the organizational and 169
the technological aspects of the system [11], and also address the complexity and 170
additional type of assets that a CPS encompass. In order to assure compliance with 171
Security and safety requirements, there is a need to define and adopt a holistic 172
framework for Risk Assessment and Treatment activities of CPSs, and so this 173
section shows the proposed framework. Figure 1 shows how each step of the 174
framework falls inside one of the phases of the PDCA cycle. It is a divided into 175
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• Adding/ Modeling specific 
threats according to the CPS.
• Valuation vs CIA triad.
• Conducting risk assessment 
• Using a specific dedicated 
tool that matches our CPS.
• Execute and operate.
Start
• Asset functional design of the CPS
• Relations and the dependencies btw 
components
• Asset rating vs CIA.
1. System Functional Modeling
• Regularity analysis and Auditing
• Check Compliance with global and 
local applicable laws. 
6. Compliance
• Using dedicated tools to check 
for vulnerabilities.
• Check at all levels: network, OS, 
applications and services. 
5. Vulnerability Assessment
2. Threat Selection/ Modeling
3. Risk Management
4. Safeguard implementation:
• Evaluate and monitor the 
effectiveness of the safeguards
• Are the applied safeguards acting 
well after observing them 




Fig. 1 The proposed framework inspired by the PDCA cycle
1. System Functional Modeling 177
2. Threat Selection and Modeling 178
3. Applying a Risk Management method (Assessment and Treatment plan) 179
4. Safeguard implementation 180
5. Vulnerability assessment 181
6. Compliance and Validation 182
7. Maintenance and Improvement 183
To ensure the continuous improvement, the framework is based on Deming PDCA 184
Cycle where each phase, because of the complexity of a CPS, can be divided further 185
in a few steps. The steps are applied in order: starting by the “PLAN” phase, first 186
step is the “System Functional Modeling” which designs the model for the CPS 187
showing the functionalities, dependencies, relations between the assets and defines 188
also rules and Acceptable Risk Levels. Then the second step, “Threat Modeling 189
and Selection” selects the potential “threats” that match the CPS’s assets: this can 190
be done by referring to historical data such as reports, statistics, observations, logs, 191
etc. Finally, always in PLAN phase, the first two steps are the input to the “Risk 192
Management” step, where an appropriate method is selected to assess the risk 193
(Risk Assessment) and helps in selecting the appropriate measures for keeping the 194
risks under control (Risk Treatment). After that “Safeguard Implementation” takes 195
place, reflecting the “DO” phase of a PDCA, where the chosen decisions in the Plan 196
phase are put into operation. Afterwards there is the CHECK phase, represented by 197
the “Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Test” process: it plays a key role in 198
revealing the vulnerabilities yet present on the system and not protected by already 199
installed safeguards. Because a CPS contains various set of HW/SW assets such 200
as network appliances, servers, end-points, applications, web services, databases, 201
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on three levels: Application, Network and Operation System Levels. Based on all 203
previous findings and evidences, the CHECK phase is completed by a compliance 204
control to ensure complying of the system to security best practices or international 205
standards, e.g. ISO/IEC 27001/27002. Finally, the Deming Cycle is concluded 206
by the ACT phase which contains “Maintenance and Improvement” activities to 207
correct and improve the system. 208
3.1 System Functional Modeling (Asset Modeling) 209
Creating a functional model has a great impact in showing the structure and the 210
components of the CPS, and in demonstrating the relations and the dependencies 211
between the different assets, and hence to have a clear and precise simulation for the 212
system in real life. It is the step where the whole framework depends on, in this stage 213
it is meant to model the physical and cyber components and their interactions and 214
operational characteristics. Asset Modeling can be considered as the most important 215
step in this approach, it must be done first with the owners of the system. The scope 216
of this part is to help the system’s owners or information sources in creating a system 217
functional model and in the valuation of the system’s assets. For this task, two steps 218
are followed: 219
(i) Creating a functional model for the system which is a structured representa- 220
tion of the system’s components (assets) and functions (activities, processes, 221
operations). 222
(ii) Rating of the assets (based on CIA) using criticality levels and according to the 223
consequences on CIA that would happen case of their protection failure. 224
The two steps must be done by the owners or under the supervision of them. In this 225
way, a typical representation or a general view for the system is carried out which 226
aids in the risk management study. 227
3.2 Threat Selection and Modeling 228
Each CPS differs by the services and functionalities that it offers. Threats vary from 229
one system to another, based on the available assets and their level of valuation. 230
Different CPSs means different assets and though different types of threats. Threats 231
can be grouped and associated to homogenous group of assets called asset classes. 232
Threat selection is about understanding the most suitable threats that are expected 233
to happen and matching them with the different asset classes of the cyber physical 234
system. The appropriate threats-to-assets should be selected in this step to be fed into 235
the “Risk Management study” step, and should be applicable to the assets presented 236
in the previous step. Mainly cyber-security threats are covered; that is, threats 237
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Fig. 2 Common threats for the “Threat selection and Modeling” step in CPS
IT threats could also be included in order to cover threats to physical assets that 239
are necessary for the operation of the PS. This work can be done by referring to 240
historical data, e.g.: reports, statistics, observations, logs, etc. 241
The ENISA Threat Landscape provides an overview of threats, together with 242
current and emerging trends. It is based on publicly available data and provides 243
an independent view on observed threats, threat agents and threat trends. Over 140 244
recent reports from security industry, networks of excellence, standardization bodies 245
and other independent institutes have been analyzed [12], Fig. 2 shows a sample 246
for some threats that threaten cyber physical systems. However risk analysts are 247
responsible for selecting and valuating the appropriate and expected threats that are 248
likely to occur and match the system’s assets. First the general model is obtained 249
by experts, reports, statistics, and then threats that match the context, type of the 250
CPS and the given assets are kept and fed to the next step. Threat Modeling eases 251
the risk analysis study in various ways, mainly it prepares a wealthy and substantial 252
threats-to-assets convenient dataset that fits a case study. There are some dedicated 253
tools that help in threat modeling, and Sect. 4.2 shows one of them which is used by 254
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3.3 Risk Management Plan 256
Risk management is divided into risk analysis and risk treatment, with risk analysis 257
being the systematic process for estimating the risks to which the system’s assets are 258
exposed to [13]. Risk management is a part of planning, where treatment decisions 259
are taken. These decisions are demonstrated and established in the implementation 260
step. 261
1. Risk analysis: A risk is an indicator of what could happen to the assets if 262
not properly protected. It is important to know what features are of interest in 263
each asset and to what extent these features are in danger, that is, analyze the 264
system [13]. There are several methods and ways for the problem of analyzing 265
the risks: informal handbooks, methodical approaches or supporting tools, where 266
all provide a guide for risk analysis. However, methods might differ in some 267
steps, or in the way of identifying and valuating the assets or threats. Some are 268
basically used in cyber security of information systems, and others can be used 269
in physical security. Risk analysis study must be applied using an appropriate 270
method and tool for the risk analysis step in the cybersecurity of CPSs. Applying 271
a risk analysis study includes: 272
(i) Identifying and classifying assets by types, establishing dependencies 273
between them and evaluating them according to security dimensions. 274
(ii) Identifying and valuating threats and their likelihood. 275
(iii) Identifying current safeguards and valuating them according to the level of 276
effectiveness. 277
(iv) Evaluating the risk on the CPS system where valuations for assets, depen- 278
dencies, and threats are all involved in the calculation. 279
2. Treatment plan: On the other hand, this sub-step must also carry out the risk 280
treatment activities that should be applied. Risk treatment activities allow a 281
security plan to be prepared which, when implemented and operated, meets 282
the proposed objectives with the level of risk accepted by the Management. In 283
the treatment plan, the right counter measures are selected with types, and then 284
prioritized. Moreover defining their cost/complexity, effectiveness and efficiency 285
metrics must be also addressed. The objective is to deploy the controls selected 286
by type and in a prioritized and effective way. For example, same safeguard 287
can contrast more threats at the same time and overlapping/redundant safeguards 288
should be avoided. However, sometimes, when a series of safeguards are in place 289
and the management process is mature to a certain extent, the system will still be 290
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3.4 Safeguard Implementation: Operations 292
This step deals with the implementation of security plans and decisions taken in the 293
treatment plan, it takes as input the activities defined and puts them into operation. 294
It also deals more with the technical side, and defines the best technological 295
solutions based on the countermeasures to be adopted and the approved budget in 296
accordance with the defined strategy. Implementation of safeguards must ensure 297
the availability and the capability of the organizational staff to manage the tasks 298
scheduled to implement them, as well as other factors, such as the budget of the 299
organization, relations with other bodies, legal, regulatory or contractual changes, 300
etc. So applying security patches and ensuring the secure configuration of all 301
appliances is maintained continuously, also assets are monitored and logs are 302
analyzed to detect any improper actions. Even when the risks have been treated, 303
residual risks will generally remain. Residual risk means that that the current level 304
of risk is accepted and is under a “carefully chosen” threshold, as trying to eliminate 305
it could be extremely expensive. 306
3.5 Vulnerability Assessment 307
Vulnerability is a weakness in the assets that a malicious attacker could use to 308
cause damage. Increasingly sophisticated tools help to penetrate existing network 309
connections. After implementing the safeguards in the previous step, a vulnerability 310
management process is needed to check if the assets of the cyber physical system 311
are really still exploitable to threats. At the technical level, the focus is on cyber 312
assets, this step is done by vulnerability exposure tools, with simulation of attack 313
paths (similar to MITRE attack matrix). The end result can be patch management or 314
better, in some complex environment, virtual patching (i.e. putting layer of defense 315
that stop the attack before it reaches the endpoint, without the need to change 316
configurations of the endpoint itself). Furthermore, log analysis could be useful 317
in revealing vulnerabilities; but consider that doing manual log analysis requires a 318
significant amount of expertise, knowledge, and is very time consuming. At the end, 319
when detecting issues, it is required to return to the iteration cycles for proposals 320
and solutions. 321
3.6 Compliance 322
Assessing the adherence of security configurations to the policies, requirements and 323
regulations are set out in this stage. Compliance activities also involve regulatory 324
analysis in order to ensure the compliance with global and local applicable laws 325
based on the requirements, or even with respect to verification schemes to be 326
achieved or maintained. And in case of non-compliance, it is required to return to 327
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3.7 Maintenance and Improvements 329
Finally, the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the applied safeguards is 330
measured to achieve the needed improvement and maintenance. It is recommended 331
to deploy some elements that allow controlling the measures implemented in order 332
to assess their effectiveness and to have an insight about them to figure out if there 333
are new problems or there is a need to update their level. 334
4 Case Study: Adopting the Framework by Ansaldo STS 335
Company 336
This section shows how the proposed framework is applied at Ansaldo STS 337
Company. Each subsection describes the procedure followed in the goal of adopting 338
it. The seven steps are demonstrated below, showing how they were applied to 339
achieve this overall high level framework of Risk analysis and treatment for CPS. 340
4.1 System Functional Model 341
The first step is to design a functional model for the system, i.e. it is fundamental 342
to define the scope of the system, the basic components forming the CPS and 343
their composing assets (physical and cyber), and also establishing the relations and 344
dependencies between them. This step is done based on information coming from 345
the owners, since they are familiar and have the knowledge about their system. The 346
functional model will be used to rate the assets against the basic security dimensions 347
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA triad), as shown in the Fig. 3:AQ2 348
Then provide a high level asset rating for each with the assistance of the system’s 349
owners and based on the tables defined below. Figure 4 gives an example of the 350
asset’s security dimensions rating, where each asset has a triad rating that represents 351
respectively the confidentiality, integrity and availability rate. 352
The assets’ rating is carried out on each security dimension. Rating represent a 353
pre-valuation step for the assets, where criticality levels will be used with a scale 354
from 1 to 4, where “1” describes the lowest critical level and “4” is the highest. And 355
so, each security dimension gets one of the four levels representing the rate value. 356
For each level, a description is given that helps in choosing the suitable asset’s 357
level. The three tables below explain the levels of rating according to each securityAQ3 358










H. Mokalled et al.
Fig. 3 A functional model example for the CPS
Fig. 4 Rating each security
dimension for each asset
4.2 Threat Modeling and Selection: Using RMAT Software 360
Threat modeling and selection step is about preparing a set of appropriate threats and 361
associate them to asset classes and organizing them also into classes. In particular to 362
execute these actions a dedicated commercial tool, called RMAT, has been identified 363
and adopted. Modeling is meant to prepare the threats selected; RMAT software can 364
be used in the modeling. RMAT is used to create TSV files using a GUI, a TSV 365
file is a representation for threats. Identifying threats for the TSV file is made by 366
associating threats to asset families. The left panel of Fig. 6 shows the asset families 367
and the threats associated to each one, while the right panel shows the single threats 368
and the asset families associated to each one. 369










A Comprehensive Framework for the Security Risk Management of Cyber-. . .
Fig. 5 Creating TSV file
using RMAT
Table 1 Asset’s rating levels for Confidentiality
CONFIDENTIALITY
Level Title Description Consequence in case of loss of 
confidentiality
4 Confidential Asset 
Asset with a special sensitivity which 
must be accessed by special authorized 
staff or services.
Serious impact: Damage could affect
directly the system, Customer or
organizations.
3 Restricted Asset
Assets which must be accessed only by 
authorized staff members or services.
Significant impact: the reputation of the
system can be harmed.
2 Internal Asset
Assets for internal usage in the system 
which must be accessed only by 
internal staff.
Negligible Impact: If the confidentiality
is breached, small or inconsiderable
consequences will happen for the system.
1 Public Assets Assets of the system which can be accessed by anyone or any service. 
Insignificant impact. No damages for
the System, Customer or Organizations.




The assets must not be compromised by 
anyone.
Serious impact: The consequences could be 
catastrophic for the system.
3 Medium
The assets can be compromised by only 
service personnel with privileged or 
extended user rights.
Significant impact. The consequences are
major and widespread. System errors and 
services breach persist for a substantial 
amount of time.  
2 Low
The assets can be compromised by internal 
users even if not having any privileged and 
extended user right.
Minor Impact. The consequences are
noticeable but workaround can be 
implemented within the system.  
1 Negligible
The assets can be compromised by anyone 
even external users.
Negligible impact. Small or inconsiderable
consequences which will not have noticeable 
influence on the system’s operation. 
Consequence if there would be 
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Unavailability is unacceptable. The asset 
fails immediately and cannot be re-
established by a workaround. 
High impact on system’s operation, which 
may lead to a complete stop or a main impact 
on the system. Impacts on the public image of
the system and/or of the customer. 
3 Major
A very short period of unavailability can be 
accepted during which assets will be unable 
to provide the intended work. 
Medium impact affects the system partially
and may lead to a delay in the operation of the
system.   
2 Minor
A short period of unavailability can be 
accepted,assets can be re-established by the 
implementation of alternative procedures. 
Small impact on the operation.
Small delay with low impact on the operation.
1 Insignificant 
Unavailability is acceptable. 
Asset’s continuity is not affected. 
Very-small impact on the operation.
No direct delay on the system.  
Consequence of Availability 
deficiency 
Fig. 6 Associating threats to
asset classes using RMAT
file ::= 371
<threat-standard-values> 372
{ family }0+ 373
</threat-standard-values> 374
family ::= 375
<family F > 376
{ threat }0+ 377
</family> 378
threat ::= 379
<threat Z f [ s ] > 380
{ set }0+ 381
</threat> 382
set ::= 383
<set D deg /> 384
After creating the appropriate set of threat families, next is to use it as input to 385
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4.3 Conducting Risk Management Study Using MAGERIT 387
Method 388
For performing this job, Ansaldo STS has identified and adopted a commercial tool, 389
named PILAR, that implements a method called MAGERIT which is suggested 390
by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). 391
Following a methodical way in a risk management study is significant in order 392
to obtain an efficient study. The objective of MAGERIT method is to cover both 393
risk analysis and treatment for a thorough risk management. MAGERIT is an 394
open methodology for Risk Analysis and Management, developed by the Spanish 395
Ministry of Public Administrations. The purpose of this method is directly related 396
to the generalized use of IT systems, communications, and electronic media. This 397
method follows the international concepts as in ISO 31000 and ISO/IEC 27005 398
[13]. MAGERIT offers a systematic method for analyzing risks, and helps in 399
describing and planning the appropriate measures for keeping the risks under 400
control. And finally, prepares the organization for the processes of evaluating, 401
auditing, certifying or accrediting, as relevant in each case. On the other hand, 402
PILAR software implements MAGERIT method and is used to perform its steps. Its 403
GUI (graphical user interface) enables the user to execute the MAGERIT method 404
in an understandable and easy way, also making it reproducible. The tool provides 405
fast calculations and generates a quantity of textual and graphical reports. PILAR 406
software has been funded by the Spanish National Security Agency. It is designed 407
to support the risk management process along long periods, providing incremental 408
analysis as the safeguards improve [14]. PILAR enables the user to create a project, 409
identify the assets for the system under study, and generate threats and safeguards 410
and other functionalities (Fig. 7). 411
Furthermore, PILAR can be customized to use TSV files created by RMAT as 412
input for the risk management study, so in this case the threats will be selected based 413
on the model created before in” Threat Modeling” step. 414
4.4 Safeguard Implementation 415
The safeguard implementation step reflects the “DO” phase of the PDCA, which 416
is putting the chosen decisions in the previous treatment plan into operation. At 417
Ansaldo STS, the Defense in Depth (DiD) approach is adopted while implementing 418
safeguards, an approach that is based on layering and that helps in faster detection 419
and slowing down of attacks. In IT environments, DiD is intended to increase the 420
costs of an attack against the organization, by detecting attacks, allowing time to 421
respond to such attacks, and providing layers of defense so that even successful 422
attacks will not fully compromise an organization. A DiD strategy is necessary 423
because of the new security threats and the importance of IT security monitoring 424
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Fig. 7 PILAR software:
homepage
Fig. 8 Layering: defense in
depth
4.5 Vulnerability Assessment for Cyber Assets 426
The cyber side of a CPS contains various set of assets such as network appliances, 427
servers, software, web applications, databases, etc. At Ansaldo STS, vulnerability 428
assessment is applied basically on 3 levels: operating system, netowrk and applica- 429
tion levels. 430
• OS Vulnerability Assessment: On the level of operating system, what is meant 431
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allows the administrators to go beyond testing for known network vulnerabil- 433
ities, but also examining more vulnerabilities such as patch levels, check OS 434
configuration, and installed software on computers running operating system. 435
• Network Vulnerability Assessment: Network scanners are useful to analyze the 436
network, and hosts on the network to detect vulnerabilities. Nmap (Network 437
Mapper) is a security scanner used on this level to discover hosts and services 438
on a computer network, thus building a “map” of the network. Nmap features 439
include host discovery, port scanning, OS detection, which all help in finding 440
and exploiting vulnerabilities in the network. 441
• Web Application Vulnerability Assessment: This can be done using automated 442
web application and web services vulnerability scanning solutions that apply 443
attack algorithms and determine the existence and relative severity of vulnerabil- 444
ities. Some dedicated tools employ an extensive arsenal of attack agents designed 445
to detect security flaws in web-based applications. Such tools probe the system 446
with thousands of HTTP requests and evaluates each individual response. This 447
assessment detects vulnerabilities, pinpoint their location in the application, and 448
recommend corrective actions. 449
4.6 Compliance 450
Compliance can be oriented to internal policies and rules or to external laws and 451
regulations, but in any case it represents a fundamental step in order to maintain 452
the organization control inside its specific regulatory environment. PILAR software 453
can be also used to conduct this step by using a security profile (EVL file) that is a 454
description for a list of policies that a system would comply to. It is a view over a 455
collection of safeguards that aim to protect a system. Security profiles may focus on 456
some specific aspects, or may be general. The use of a security profile in a project 457
is basically to check and ensure compliance. It is also possible to create custom 458
security profiles, while some widely known are already available e.g.: ISO/IEC 459
27002. PILAR maps security profiles to its safeguards in such a way to estimate 460
to which extent the system is compliant (Fig. 9). 461
After loading a security profile into the project, the set of controls for that 462
particular profile are given a score based on the evaluation of safeguards that are 463
relevant to those controls only, thus giving a measure to check the compliance of 464
the system to the selected security profile. 465
4.7 Maintenance and Improvement 466
At the end, after executing all the steps of the framework, it is critical to monitor and 467
observe if the decisions taken were effective, and if there is a need for maintenance 468
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Fig. 9 Applying the security
profiles in the compliance
step
Fig. 10 Safeguards values in
PLAN phase
situations it could be necessary to reduce the cost of a certain countermeasure. Using 470
PILAR in the PLAN phase, the “current” stage represents the current state of the 471
system, and “target” stage represents the goal to reach (Fig. 10). However, now 472
in the “ACT” phase, a new target (Fig. 11) will represent the new goal to achieve 473
based on the new observations and analysis done, and putting all (new) safeguards 474
into operation. The system is monitored and a set of investigations and observations 475
based e.g. on some key performance indicators is done to apply the refinement in 476
case it is required. 477
5 Conclusion 478
In recent years, a growth has been seen in the development of various types of 479
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). They have brought impacts to almost all aspects of 480
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Fig. 11 New Safeguards
values in ACT phase
they are exposed to different types of attacks. A Cyber Physical System (CPS) relies 482
basically on information and communication technology, which puts the system’s 483
assets under certain risks especially cyber ones. On the other hand, because of the 484
characteristics of a CPS, it is more efficient to adopt a solution that is wider than a 485
method, and addresses the type, functionalities and complexity of a CPS. Moreover, 486
following a comprehensive framework ensures a lot of key points such as organizing 487
the steps of a management study, preserving the order of the tasks without missing 488
one, and basically doing the work once in a formalized structure, which is the key 489
spirit of what is called “Comprehensive”, and this should lead automatically to the 490
customer satisfaction and ensuring that the risk management study is complied with 491
laws and regulations. In this chapter, a holistic framework is proposed that breaks 492
the restriction to a traditional risk assessment method, and encompasses wider set 493
of procedures which can be followed in the risk management study for the CPSs, 494
giving more attention to the cyber side that usually controls the physical side of 495
CPSs. Finally, this framework is also ready to accommodate another two security 496
dimensions which are the “authenticity” and “traceability”, that are relevant and 497
should be addressed as security requirements for the risk management of CPSs. 498
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